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4. double tax treaties: an introduction
reuven s. avi-yonah
The existing network of more than 2,500 bilateral double tax treaties (DTTs) 
represents an important part of international law. The current DTTs are all based 
on two models, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and United Nations (UN) model DTTs, which in turn are based on 
models developed by the League of Nations between 1927 and 1946. Despite 
some differences that will be discussed below, all DTTs are remarkably similar 
in the topics covered (even the order of articles are always the same) and in their 
language. About 75% of the actual words of any given DTT are identical with the 
words of any other DTT. Thus, the DTT network is the most important element 
of the international tax regime, that is, the generally applicable rules governing 
income taxation of cross-border transactions. Indeed, I have argued that given 
the similarities among all DTTs, certain rules embodied in them (such as the 
requirement to prevent double taxation by granting an exemption or a foreign 
tax credit) have become part of customary international law, and therefore may 
be binding even in the absence of a DTT.
DTTs are generally titled “Convention Between [Country X] and [Country Y] 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With 
Respect to Taxes on Income.” This title provides us with quite a bit of informa-
tion. First, DTTs are bilateral: They represent a bargain between two countries, 
like BITs but unlike other economic law treaties, such as the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Moreover, unlike the BITs, DTTs generally do not 
contain a Most Favored Nation (MFN) article, which means that their provisions 
cannot be transferred to third countries.
Second, the title states that the DTT, like all DTTs, is for the “Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion.” In truth, DTTs are gener-
ally not necessary to prevent double taxation, although they may help in border-
line situations, such as cases where the source of income is disputed. This is 
because almost all countries prevent double taxation (i.e., taxation by both the 
residence and source country) unilaterally by having the residence country either 
grant an exemption to foreign source income or grant a foreign tax credit for 
source country tax on that income. Since these provisions apply unilaterally 
without a DTT, DTTs are generally not needed to prevent double taxation.
If DTTs do not address double taxation, what do they do? DTTs shift tax rev-
enue from source countries to residence countries, because under the generally 
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accepted rules, the source country is allowed to impose the first tax on any revenue 
deriving from sources within it. In the absence of a DTT, source countries can 
tax both active and passive income within the country. In addition, source coun-
tries are not bound by a permanent establishment or DTT sourcing rule defining 
what income originates within the country.
DTTs shift the burden of taxation from source to residence country in two 
ways. The main mechanism for active income is the definition of permanent 
establishment. DTTs generally bar source-based taxation unless an enterprise of 
the other state has a permanent establishment, i.e., some kind of fixed base of 
operations directly or through a dependent agent, in the source country. The 
main mechanism for passive income is a reduction in withholding at its source. 
The U.S. model DTT, for example, reduces taxation on interest and royalties to 
zero; the only category of passive income that is eligible for source-based taxation 
is dividends, which are taxed at a reduced rate. The OECD model DTT, which is 
the main model for developed countries, reduces tax on royalties to zero but has 
a positive rate on interest and dividends. The UN model DTT, which is the main 
model for developing countries, has higher rates of source-based taxation on pas-
sive income (and a lower permanent establishment threshold for active income), 
but even it shifts tax revenues from the source to the residence country.
This DTT structure works well if the flows of income are reciprocal, but it 
creates a problem for developing countries. In the reciprocal situation, residents 
of country A derive income from sources from country B, and residents of coun-
try B derive income from sources of income from country A. In the absence of 
the DTT, country A will tax the country B residents’ source income, and country 
B will tax the country A residents’ source income; both countries A and B 
will probably grant a tax credit or exemption to alleviate double taxation and 
encourage cross-border investment. The DTT shifts the taxation of some catego-
ries of income, particularly passive income, from the source to the residence coun-
try. Under the DTT, country B will not tax passive income that goes to country A 
residents, and country A will not tax passive income that goes to country B resi-
dents. As long as the capital flows are more or less reciprocal, the DTT reduces 
the administrative burden of imposing withholding taxes, and the net revenue is 
more or less the same. The amount that country A loses by not imposing its 
withholding tax is regained by not having to give credit for the taxes imposed by 
country B on income its own residents earn overseas. For example, suppose that 
investors from B are taxed on $100 at a rate of 30% and this falls to 0%, then 
A loses $30 in revenue. This however would be offset if A also saw the tax on 
its $100 in investment on B fall from 30% to 0%, allowing it to tax this income 
at its standard rate. However, if A has no investment in B, then this is just a loss 
of $30.
If the investment flow only goes one way, and investment always flows from 
country B into country A, then it is much harder to get into a DTT because a DTT 
will always transfer revenue from country A to country B. Thus, developing 
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countries have traditionally not chosen to enter into DTTs with developed coun-
tries because the DTTs lead to a loss of tax revenue. Some developed countries, 
such as Germany, Sweden and Japan, have historically had extensive DTT net-
works with developing countries because they were willing to provide tax-sparing 
credits (credits for taxes that would have been collected at source but for a tax 
holiday), but the United States, which refuses to grant tax sparing in its DTTs, 
had few DTTs with developing countries until the 1990s, although the situation 
has changed somewhat in recent years. One reason for the recent expansion in 
U.S. DTTs with developing countries is that the DTT provides certainty for U.S. 
investors regarding the tax law of the other country, and most developing coun-
tries consider it to their benefit to encourage U.S. investment. Another reason is 
that DTTs generally include an exchange-of-information provision that allows 
the developing country to obtain information exchanged from the United States, 
and developing countries have increasingly been interested in trying to tax capital 
invested by their rich residents overseas.
Since the OECD model is the source of most DTTs, we shall focus on it and 
compare it to the UN and U.S. models. One such difference is that the U.S. 
model DTT, but not the OECD or UN models, “shall not restrict in any manner 
any benefits now or hereafter accorded by the laws of either contracting state.” In 
other words, from a U.S. perspective, DTTs may never increase taxation, but 
they may only reduce the taxation that would otherwise apply. One reason for 
this is that tax laws are passed by Congress as a whole, whereas DTTs are ratified 
only by the Senate. A tax increase through a DTT would be unconstitutional 
because it would never have been ratified by the House of Representatives. 
A related point is that the United States only allows DTTs to reduce foreign 
taxation of U.S. citizens and U.S. taxation of foreigners; DTTs cannot affect 
the way the United States taxes U.S. residents. This provision is written into the 
savings clause, appearing in most U.S. tax DTTs at the end of the first article. 
The savings clause also states that people who have lost their citizenship for tax
-motivated reasons should be treated as if there were no DTT because the 
United States argues that DTTs are not designed to protect U.S. citizens from 
U.S. taxes.
Article 2 of the DTT states that the taxes covered in the DTT are only income 
taxes. For example, in U.S. DTTs, the Social Security tax, which is a payroll tax, 
is generally excluded and sometimes is covered by other agreements. Estate and 
gift taxes are also covered by other agreements. Thus, the DTT has the largest 
effect on the imposition of the income tax. Importantly, U.S. DTTs do not gener-
ally protect against any type of state tax (although in the OECD and UN models, 
sub-federal income taxes are covered). Most states have corporate and individual 
income taxes, which may impose a high burden. For example, a foreign com-
pany might wish to open an office in New York City to engage in preparatory and 
auxiliary activities, which are exempt from federal taxation by the permanent 
establishment article; however, the combined New York state and New York City 
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corporate income tax can be as high as 20%, imposing a significant tax burden on 
the company.
Article 4 covers residence and is important because it defines who is covered 
by the DTT. In general, groups covered by the DTT are tax residents (i.e., people 
considered residents for tax purposes, which generally requires physical presence 
greater than 183 days); tie-breaking rules are included to prevent dual-residency 
situations. Corporations are deemed to be residents in the country in which they 
are incorporated (the U.S. position) or in the country in which they are managed 
and controlled (the UK position).
Next we turn to a discussion of the substantive provisions. Article 5 covers 
permanent establishment. This provision is quite narrow in scope; in the OECD 
and U.S. models, the permanent establishment threshold is set high because 
they are for developed countries interested in reducing source-based taxation of 
capital-exporting enterprises. Thus, in the OECD and U.S. models, a construction 
facility or an oil drilling facility must be in the country for more than twelve 
months to be taxed, but in the UN model, it is only six months. The OECD and 
U.S. article also includes a long list of exceptions and a specific bar against 
force-of-attraction rules (such as found in the UN model) in which income is 
taxed when there is a permanent establishment, even though it is not attributable 
to the permanent establishment.
Article 6 covers real property; taxation of real property at source is allowed, 
including, as under the U.S. rule, corporations most of whose assets are real 
property. Article 7 is the business profit article, which talks about taxation of 
business profits only if they are connected to a permanent establishment; Article 
9 is the associated enterprise article, which says that if there is a transfer pricing 
adjustment and the other country agrees to it, then the other country shall make 
a corresponding adjustment to prevent double taxation – but notice that the 
other country must agree. Many transfer pricing adjustments, unfortunately are 
not agreed to by the other country and result in double taxation (source-source 
double taxation), so this article is only of a little help.
The subsequent articles reduce source-based taxation on passive income, 
dividends, interest, royalties, and capital gains. These articles are the heart of the 
DTT, whose main function (as explained above) is to reduce source-based taxa-
tion of passive income. Under the U.S. model, the only source-based taxation 
that is allowed is the tax on dividends; there is no tax at all on interest, royalties, 
or capital gains. The OECD model, by contrast, permits tax on interest. Under 
the U.S. model DTT, a tax of 5% is allowed on direct dividends (dividends to 
corporations that own a high percentage of the shares) and 15 % for portfolio 
dividends, but recent U.S. DTTs reduce the tax on direct dividends to zero.
The next articles address independent services and other special topics. Article 
22 of the U.S. model covers limitation of benefits and is a major element in 
modern U.S. DTTs. The limitation-of-benefits article is designed to prevent 
treaty-shopping (i.e., the use of treaties between two countries by parties from 
a third, nontreaty country to obtain withholding tax reductions) such as the 
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SDI case, in which copyrighted software located in Bermuda was licensed to the 
Netherlands and from there licensed to the United States, and royalties were 
paid from the United States to the Netherlands and from the Netherlands to 
Bermuda. This was beneficial to the company because the Netherlands has a 
DTT with the United States that reduces taxation of the royalties to zero and 
Bermuda (a tax haven) does not. In that case, the IRS argued that although the 
royalties from the Netherlands to the United States were protected by the DTT, 
the royalties from the Netherlands to Bermuda were also U.S.-source royalties 
because of the software’s use in the United States; however, the court rejected 
that argument, saying that if it permitted the taxation of the Netherlands-
Bermuda royalties it would be allowing double taxation if the U.S.-Netherlands 
royalties were not protected by DTT. This seems like a strange argument because 
the treaty-shopping occurred only because of the DTT, so that there would be no 
U.S.-Netherlands royalties if the DTT did not exist.
Most U.S. DTTs did not have elaborate anti-treaty-shopping mechanisms 
before the 1980s, and other countries were able to use those DTTs to get reduced 
withholding taxation. Consider the example of the Netherlands Antilles, a 
Caribbean tax haven that used to belong to the Netherlands. Before the enact-
ment of the portfolio interest exemption in 1984, U.S. companies established 
Netherlands Antilles subsidiaries and were subject to a zero withholding tax on 
interest from those subsidiaries through the U.S.-Netherlands DTT. In 1984, the 
United States terminated the extension of the DTT to the Netherlands Antilles 
and enacted a portfolio interest exemption; at the same time, it instituted a limi-
tation of benefits. These limitation-of-benefits articles in U.S. DTTs are often 
much more complicated than the model version because other countries want to 
create loopholes to allow for treaty-shopping. In addition, the OECD and UN 
models do not contain limitation on benefits, although the commentary on 
Article 1 of the OECD model has a model limitation on benefits article.
Limitation-of-benefits provisions state that the DTT confers benefits only on 
individuals who are physically present in the other DTT country and companies 
that either are publicly traded on a stock exchange of the other country or are 
privately owned companies that do not pay half or more of their income to a 
resident of a nontreaty country. Thus, the U.S. model DTT takes the view that 
reductions in source income taxation should be accompanied by increases in 
residence income taxation. For example, the residence article states that if an 
entity is fiscally transparent in the residence country and is a partnership not 
subject to residence-based taxation, the entity really belongs to a group of people 
in another country and is therefore not considered a resident. Thus, the DTT 
attempts to reduce taxation at the source only if taxation increases on a residence 
basis, although it is unclear that the limitation-on-benefits provisions really 
achieve this purpose.
The U.S. model DTT also includes an earning stripping provision that pre-
vents the deduction of too much interest from the United States. Note, however, 
that the provision applies to interest but not to royalties; companies may therefore 
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strip earnings through royalties without penalty. The OECD and UN models do 
not include this provision.
The United States is probably correct in insisting on limitation of benefits, 
although other countries certainly do not agree that they need to abide by the 
U.S. position. Without limitation of benefits, nontreaty countries have less 
incentive to negotiate because they have a so-called “treaty with the world,” 
meaning that they can always benefit from other countries’ DTTs by entering the 
DTT network through another country.
Article 24 contains a nondiscrimination provision stating that countries may 
not discriminate against residents of the other country. This provision is weak 
compared with similar provisions in the GATT and the BITs, and is hard to 
enforce. Article 25 is the competent authority procedure for mutual agreement, 
which provides for some (generally nonbinding) arbitration in cases where the 
DTT lacks binding force. The OECD model now contains a binding arbitration 
provision designed to prevent double taxation, and some new U.S. DTTs include 
a similar provision. Note, however, that no DTT provides for binding arbitration 
at the request of the taxpayer, like the BITs and NAFTA.
The last important component of the model DTT is the exchange-of-information 
provision, which is found in Article 26. The United States and most other OECD 
countries believe that this provision is essential if it is to enforce residence-based 
taxation on its own residents. The United States has been willing to forgo the 
ratification of a DTT rather than ignore this provision. For example, the U.S.-Israel 
DTT was delayed for almost twenty years because the Israelis were not willing to 
give sufficient written assurance of cooperation in exchange-of-information 
requests. The exchange-of-information provision raises important privacy ques-
tions: Is it necessary to make a specific request for specific information about 
a specific resident, or is it possible to request information about a group of 
residents without including names? In addition, bank secrecy provisions mean 
that often a government might not have the information requested. In addition, 
no worldwide system of tax identification numbers exists, so it is not necessarily 
true that information provided by a country could be linked to specific taxpayers.
Now we turn to two topics that are important in DTT negotiation, although 
they are not included in the model DTTs. The first topic is tax sparing, reflected 
in the provisions of Article 23, which requires that foreign tax credit be given 
only if foreign taxes are actually paid. A number of countries provide for tax-
sparing credits; Germany and Japan, for example, give credit for taxes that would 
have been collected at source from a permanent establishment or a subsidiary 
except for a tax holiday. The rationale is that a tax holiday in the absence of tax 
sparing may simply lead to a taxpayer owing more tax to the residence country; 
however, this may be an overly narrow interpretation because the availability of 
deferral and averaging (cross-crediting between high and low-tax jurisdictions) 
mean that tax holidays usually benefit taxpayers even without tax sparing. Tax 
sparing has been an especially contentious issue in DTT ratification: The U.S. 
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Senate has been insistent that it will never ratify a DTT that provides for tax spar-
ing because it can result in double nontaxation.
The second issue involves DTT overrides, which are a mostly U.S. provision 
with relatively limited scope. The U.S. Congress takes the position that treaties 
do not have a status above domestic laws; the treaty is superior if it is imple-
mented after a law, but the law is superior if it is implemented after the treaty. 
Treaty overrides are based on the supremacy clause in the U.S. Constitution that 
says that laws and treaties shall be the supreme law of the land. Because laws and 
treaties are used in the same sentence, without a specific priority given to one or 
the other, the clause has been interpreted to mean that laws and treaties have the 
same status. Unlike laws, however, treaties are negotiated with another party; 
the other party may feel that it is entitled to the benefits of the treaty without the 
risk that the treaty will be unilaterally changed by the U.S. Congress, and inter-
national law supports this argument. The U.S. position is based on the argu-
ment that DTTs are only ratified by the Senate whereas tax laws have to be passed 
by both houses of Congress, and therefore Congress must to be able to super-
sede DTTs.
Although DTT overrides are a contentious issue, the actual number of DTT 
overrides are relatively small. One explicit DTT override was the branch profit tax 
provision in 1986, which added a limitation-of-benefits rule to preexisting U.S. 
DTTs that did not have such a provision. This override is generally obsolete now 
because almost all of the DTTs that it affected have since been renegotiated.
The most recent example of a DTT override occurred in the context of tax 
arbitrage. This was a situation in which a Canadian company had an U.S. sub-
sidiary with U.S.-source income, which it repatriated to Canada. For U.S. tax 
purposes, the subsidiary was treated as a branch, and the payments to Canada 
were treated as interest that was deductible and subject to a reduced withholding 
tax under the U.S-Canada DTT. For Canadian tax purposes, the U.S. subsidiary 
was treated as a corporation, and the payments were treated as dividends, which 
are exempt in Canada. The result was double nontaxation.
The United States took the position that a reduction in tax on source income 
should be contingent on an increase in tax on residence income. The United 
States, therefore, passed a DTT override stating that taxation would not be 
reduced for hybrid entities that are treated inconsistently. Almost immediately, 
Canada agreed with the interpretation of the DTT and negotiated a protocol to 
change the DTT. Although this may imply that the DTT override was unneces-
sary because the Canadians were willing to renegotiate, it takes a lot of time to 
negotiate a protocol, so it was not necessarily inappropriate for the United States 
to use a DTT override.
Because of the contention surrounding DTT overrides, the United States hes-
itates to make use of the provision and has been very careful not to override DTTs 
since 1986. In general, the United States attempts to avoid overrides and the appear-
ance of overrides. When the U.S. earning stripping rule (restricting interest 
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deductions to tax-exempt related parties) was enacted in 1989, the United States 
went to great lengths to avoid the appearance of a DTT override by extending the 
provision to domestic tax-exempt entities and not just to foreigners, thus 
preventing an apparent violation of the nondiscrimination article.
In general, DTTs between developing countries and developed countries 
benefit the developing countries despite the absence of tax sparing because DTTs 
ensure developed country investors a certain level of institutional stability in the 
developing country. However, empirical economic studies have failed to show 
that the existence of a DTT materially affects foreign direct investment. This is 
unsurprising for DTTs between developed countries, which mostly affect the 
distribution of revenue between the governments of the two countries, but simi-
lar studies of DTTs between developing and developed countries also fail to show 
that the existence of a DTT has a significant positive effect on the flows of foreign 
direct investment into the developing country. Nevertheless, most scholars 
believe that DTTs increase investor confidence in the stability of investing in 
developing countries, and therefore, although the developing country might 
forgo some tax revenue from the DTT, it probably benefits in the long run from 
the increased foreign direct investment.
One final important issue regarding DTTs is why they are bilateral, rather 
than multilateral, such as the GATT. The usual explanation is that DTTs depend 
too much on the specific investment flows between countries, and therefore 
cannot be multilateral; however, the fact that developing countries are willing to 
enter into DTTs even if they lose revenue suggests that this is not a complete 
explanation. In my view, the fact that DTTs are bilateral is mostly due to the fact 
that the models were developed before World War II, when bilateral treaties 
were the norm, and when differences between the tax laws of different countries 
were larger than they are today. If that is true, it suggests that the time may be at 
hand to try to negotiate a multilateral DTT, especially given the difficulty DTTs 
face when dealing with “triangular cases” involving third countries. Tax laws 
have converged a lot since the 1920s, and multilateral treaties are now the norm, 
so that a renewed effort to negotiate such a multilateral DTT (perhaps in the 
World Trade Organization context) seems to be called for.
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